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Abstract
Participatory budgeting is one of the exciting developments in deliberative grass-
roots democracy. We concentrate on approval elections and propose propor-
tional representation axioms in participatory budgeting, by generalizing relevant
axioms for approval-based multi-winner elections. We observe a rich landscape
with respect to the computational complexity of identifying proportional bud-
gets and computing such, and present budgeting methods that satisfy these
axioms by identifying budgets that are representative to the demands of vast
segments of the voters.
1. Introduction
“Participatory budgeting (PB) has become a central topic of discus-
sion and significant field of innovation for those involved in democ-
racy and local development”— Cabannes [8].
“Whatever the best approach to participatory budgeting is, now is
the time to identify it, before various heuristics become hopelessly
ingrained”— Benade et al. [5].
Participatory budgeting (PB), used in hundreds of cities across several con-
tinents (especially South America)1, is a grass-root deliberative approach where
Email addresses: haris.aziz@data61.csiro.au (Haris Aziz), barton.e.lee@gmail.com (
Barton Lee), nimrodtalmon77@gmail.com (Nimrod Talmon)
1PB is used in several cities in the USA [14]. Paris is organizing one of the largest citywide
participatory budgets (https://budgetparticipatif.paris.fr/bp).
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common people make public budgeting decisions. One of its primary advan-
tages is “the more transparent management and more accessible municipal pro-
cess that it allows” [8]. PB is very successful, however most methods currently
used do not take into account a formal approach to proportionality. The lack
of sufficient representation of key groups in participatory budgeting can be a
critical shortcoming as has been witnessed in a participatory budgeting program
in Porto Alegre, Brazil [6]. We undertake a formal approach to representative
participatory budgeting in which we propose both representation axioms and
rules for achieving representative budgets. As it has been observed that the ex-
act way PB is implemented is critical to its success such a principled axiomatic
and rule-based approach may especially be useful. The problem of finding the
right approach to solve PB has been mentioned as a “grand challenge for com-
putational social choice, especially at a point in the field’s evolution where it is
gaining real-world relevance by helping people make decisions in practice” [5].
Formally, we view participatory budgeting as a generalization of multi-
winner elections, specifically since in multi-winner elections usually we aim at
selecting k candidates out of a given set of m candidates, while in participatory
budgeting each of the given candidates (usually referred to as projects or items)
does not come at unit cost, but has its own cost. The task is then to find a
satisfactory set of projects (notice, not specifically k of them) whose total cost
does not go beyond some specified budget limit L. The task is achieved while
taking into account the preferences expressed by the electorate.
Most methods (see Section 1.1) of participatory budgeting do not take into
account aspects of proportionality; for example, one popular method uses k-
Approval, by letting each voter specify a set of k projects of her liking, then
order the projects by decreasing number of (sum of) approvals, and greedily go
over the list, taking (as a “committee member”) each project which does not
cause the proposed expenditure to go over the given limit.
In certain situations, however, it is desirable to find budgets which are more
proportional. For example, if deciding on building, say, schools or recreational
parks in a city, the number of schools per neighborhood shall be roughly propor-
tional to the population; specifically, building schools only in the city center–
where many residents live–is usually not an accepted outcome.
Luckily, in the study of multi-winner election (i.e., in literature on committee
selection) there are quite a number of ideas on how to achieve such proportion-
ality; specifically, several axioms of proportionality have been devised, together
with several voting rules satisfying these axioms. Our approach for formalizing
and achieving proportionality in PB is thus to explore ways of generalizing the
axioms formulating proportionality in multi-winner elections; in effect, “lifting”
the knowledge from committee voting / multi-winner voting to participatory
budgeting (where the latter generalizes the former, by considering various costs
for the candidates).
Contributions. We initiate a formal axiomatic approach to participatory bud-
geting in which each project is either selected or not selected, each voter approves
a subset of the available projects, and the goal is to identify a proportionally
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representative budget.
We present a series of proportional representation axioms which generalize
the JR (justified representation) and PJR (proportional justified representation)
axioms considered in approval-based multi-winner voting [2, 20] . Our quest for
the ‘right’ axioms is motivated by the following main factors: (1) they should
have normative justification in representing large-enough and cohesive groups of
voters; (2) they should be strong enough to identify particularly representative
outcomes but not too strong so that for some instances no satisfying outcomes
exist; and (3) they should be computationally amenable, ideally admitting a
polynomial-time algorithm.
Our study includes a detailed examination of promising proportional repre-
sentation axioms, computational results on finding and testing representative
budgets, as well as identifying the logical relations between the axioms. In
practical terms, we propose several algorithms that find suitable budgets with
axiomatic guarantees of proportionality. One of the most compelling algorithms
we present is a careful generalization of Phragmen’s unordered rule (also referred
to as Phragmen’s sequential rule [7, 16]). Most of our results are summarized
in Table 1.
1.1. Related Work
Participatory budgeting [8] is concerned with letting citizens decide upon
the way their collective funds are being used. We discuss some methods by
which this is done. Knapsack voting, which is similar to k-Approval, but where
each voter approves a set of projects whose total cost does not go over the given
limit, is considered by Goel et al. [15]. In an earlier paper, Klamler et al. [17]
presented algorithms for committee selection with knapsack constraints. Both
these works have utilitarian concerns and do not capture proportional represen-
tation. Further preference elicitation methods are studied by Benade et al. [5],
that allow voters to either rank the candidates by their value (Value voting)
or value-for-money (Value-for-money voting), and so-called Threshold voting,
where each voter specifies the subset of projects whose value is perceived to be
above a predefined threshold. Shapiro and Talmon [21] generalize Condorcet’s
principle to PB and devise a polynomial-time budgeting method to compute
such budgets; these budgets are majoritarian in nature, while here we are con-
cerned with budgets satisfying proportional representation.
Fain et al. [11] study proportional representation in participatory budgeting,
thus their work is closely related to ours. In their model, however, the task is to
decide the amount of funds to spend on each project, while our model is more
discrete, as we aim at deciding which projects to fund. Indeed, some projects are
inherently indivisible or discrete in nature. For example, one can decide to fund
one road or two roads, say, but not a road an a half. Aziz et al. [1] discuss how
a probabilistic approach to voting can be used to address PB. Just like the work
of Fain et al. [11], the approach applies to projects that are ‘divisible’ in nature.
Another related paper is by Conitzer et al. [10], who consider proportionality
issues in fair division problems. There, however, proportionality is considered
at the level of individuals and cohesive groups of voters are not considered.
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The study of multi-winner elections [12] is a thriving sub-field of compu-
tational social choice [19], and is concerned mainly with aggregation method
for committee selection in which each candidate has a unit cost. Some papers
exist which study election scenarios with different costs for different candidates,
such as the paper of Lu and Butilier [18], who consider a generalization of the
Chamberlin–Courant rule [9]. There are quite a number of papers within the
sub-field of multi-winner elections which concentrate on issues of proportional-
ity, some of which are mentioned next. Aziz et al. [2] consider proportionality
axioms for approval-based multi-winner elections. Here, we generalize this line
of work to PB. There are several follow up papers on approval-based multi-
winner (see e.g., [7, 4, 20]). The paper of Aziz et al. [3] considers multi-winner
rules extending (in certain ways) Condorcet’s principle, and demonstrates that
some of them satisfy certain axiomatic properties aiming at proportionality.
2. Preliminaries
Let C be a set of items and let w : C → R, c 7→ w(c), be the associated
cost function. We normalize the cost function such that minc∈C w(c) = 1.
This assumption is without loss of generality and assists in keeping our axioms
invariant to scalings of the currency. Abusing notation slightly, given a subset
of items C′ ⊆ C we define w(C′) =
∑
c∈C′ w(c). A budget limit will be denoted
by L; a budget W is said to be feasible if w(W ) ≤ L.
Let V be a set of voters, where each voter i ∈ V submits an approval ballot
Ai ⊆ C, which is an unranked ballot of items in C which they approve of. The
vector of approval ballots, called a ballot profile, is denoted by A = (A1, . . . , An).
A set of voters V ′ ⊆ V is said to be cohesive if ∩i∈V ′Ai 6= ∅, that is, if they
unanimously agree/support some item(s) c ∈ ∩i∈V ′Ai.
The goal of a budgeting method is to take as an input a ballot profile A and
produce an output/budget W ⊆ C which is feasible and satisfies some desirable
axioms. First, we would like our budgets to not ‘leave money on the table’; we
formalize it as follows.
Definition 1 (Exhaustiveness). Given a budget limit L and budget W , the
budget is said to be exhaustive if for all c /∈ W it holds that
w(W ∪ {c}) = w(W ) + w(c) > L.
If this is not the case, the we say that the budget W is non-exhaustive.
The second class of axioms, discussed in Section 3, relate to justified repre-
sentation in the budget outcome W with respect to the ballot profile A. Next,
we point out how the setting we consider generalizes approval-based committee
voting.
Committee Voting / Multi-winner Voting. In approval-based multi-winner elec-
tion we have a set of candidates C and a set of voters V , where each voter
V corresponds to a subset of C, consisting of her approved candidates. The
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Existence guaranteed? Computational complexity of testing Computational complexity of computing
W W+EX L W L W W+EX L
BJR yes yes yes P (Prop. 5) P (Prop. 5) P (W = ∅) P (Prop. 4) P (Prop. 4)
Strong-BJR yes no no P (Prop. 5) P (Prop. 5) P (W = ∅) NP-h (Prop. 1) NP-h (Prop. 1)
Local-BPJR yes yes yes Co-NP-c Co-NP-c P (W = ∅) P (Prop. 6; GPseq) P (Prop. 6; GPseq)
BPJR yes yes yes Co-NP-c Co-NP-c P (W = ∅) Open NP-h (Prop. 3)
Strong-BPJR yes no no Co-NP-c Co-NP-c P (W = ∅) NP-h (Prop. 1) NP-h (Prop. 1)
Table 1: Summary of our results. For each proportionality axiom PA we state (1) whether
a budget satisfying PA is guaranteed to exist; (2) what is the computational complexity of
testing whether a specific budget satisfies PA ; and (3) what is the computational complexity
of computing a budget satisfying PA . (NP-h denotes NP-hardness, Co-NP-c denotes Co-
NP-completeness, EX denotes exhaustiveness, and GPseq denotes that our generalization of
Phragmen’s sequential rule satisfies the axiom. The co-NP-c results follow from the fact that
testing PJR is co-NP-complete in approval-based multi-winner voting [4].)
task is to select a committee S ⊆ C of k candidates. Observe that, if L = k
and w(c) = 1 for each c ∈ C, then our setting coincides with approval-based
committee voting / multi-winner voting.
Several axioms of representation for multi-winner elections are known from
the literature; here we recall two of them.
Definition 2 (JR [2]). A committee S satisfies JR if there exists no set of voters
V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≥ n/k, such that |(∩i∈V ′Ai)| ≥ 1 and |((∪i∈V ′Ai) ∩ S)| = 0.
Definition 3 (PJR [20]). A committee S satisfies PJR if for all ℓ ∈ [1, k] there
does not exists a set of voters V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≥ ℓ n/k such that |
(
∩i∈V ′Ai
)
| ≥ ℓ
but |
(
(∪i∈V ′Ai) ∩ S
)
| < ℓ.
The intuition for JR is that a group of at least n/k voters which agree
on at least one candidate shall not be completely ignored when forming the
committee. PJR generalizes JR by considering groups of ℓn/k which agree on
at least ℓ candidates and requires such groups to be represented appropriately.
3. Proportionality Axioms for PB
In this main section we present a series of proportionality axioms that are
inspired by justified representation axioms in approval-based multi-winner vot-
ing. The relations between these axioms are discussed in Section 3.4 and are
pictorially represented in Figure 1. For each axiom, we study whether a budget
satisfying it is guaranteed to exist, the complexity of testing whether a specific
budget satisfies it, and the complexity of computing a budget satisfying it.
Informally, the general principle of our generalization of justified representa-
tion (JR) to PB is that a cohesive group of size ≥ n/L should control at least
one unit of the budget while our generalization of PJR require that, for every
ℓ ∈ [1, L], a cohesive group of size ≥ ℓ · n/L should control at least ℓ units of
the budget.
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3.1. Strong-BJR and Strong-BPJR
Our first formal extensions of JR and PJR to PB, termed Strong-BJR and
Strong-BPJR, are given next.
Definition 4 (Strong-BJR-L). For a budget limit L, a budget W satisfies
Strong-BJR-L if there exists no set of voters V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≥ n/L, such
that w
(
∩i∈V ′ Ai
)
≥ 1 but w
(
(∪i∈V ′Ai) ∩W
)
= 0.
Definition 5 (Strong-BPJR-L). For a budget limit L, a budget W satisfies
Strong-BPJR-L if for all ℓ ∈ [1, L] there does not exist a set of voters V ′ ⊆ V
with |V ′| ≥ ℓ n/L, such that w
(
∩i∈V ′ Ai
)
≥ ℓ but w
(
(∪i∈V ′Ai) ∩W
)
< ℓ.
The definitions above capture the idea that cohesive groups of at least n/L
voters should control (at least) one unit of budget. The Strong-BJR-L definition
is ‘extreme’ in the sense that a group of n/L voters and a group of 2 ·n/L voters
are treated the same; that is, they are only guaranteed a non-zero amount of
budget spent on representing them. Put differently, if voters simply desire some
item from their approval ballot Ai to be included inW but do not care about the
amount of budget spent on it, then Strong-BJR-L might be sufficient - however,
a more natural approach is to scale the amount of budget spent according to
the size of the voter groups. Indeed, Strong-BPJR-L captures this more natural
idea that a group of n/L voters should not be treated the same as a group of
2 · n/L voters - the larger group should control (at least) twice as much budget
than the smaller group; in other words, the amount of budget controlled by a
group of cohesive voters is proportional to their size.
Remark 1. Strong-BJR-L (Strong-BPJR-L) indeed generalize the definitions
of JR (PJR) for multi-winner voting: Strong-BJR-L (Strong-BPJR-L) collapses
to JR (PJR) when all items cost wi ≡ 1.
Strong-BJR-L and Strong-BPJR-L are appealing axioms in terms of their
proportionality requiremtn. Unfortunately, even Strong-BJR-L budgets are not
guaranteed to exist (notice that Strong-BPJR-L implies Strong-BJR-L; to see
this, take ℓ = 1).
Example 1. Consider a PB scenario with items C = {c1, c2, c3}, costs w(c1) =
w(c2) = 2 and w(c3) = 1, budget limit L = 3, and voters V = {1, . . . , 4} with
the following ballots.
A1 = A2 = {c1}
A3 = A4 = {c2}.
Then, to satisfy Strong-PJR-L, the group of voters V ′ = {A1, A2}, being of
size 2 ≥ n/L = 4/3, deserves at least one unit of budget; similarly for the group
of voters V ′′ = {A3, A4}. Then, to satisfy the group V1 (V2) we shall include c1
(c2) in the budget. The problem is, however, that w(c1)+w(c2) = 4 > L = 3; in
other words, with the given budget limit, we cannot afford it. This means that
no budget satisfying Strong-BJR-L exists (and thus also Strong-BPJR-L).
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The key issue illustrated in the example above is that each set of cohesive vot-
ers, namely V ′ = {A1, A2} and V ′′ = {A3, A4}, supports only expensive items
relative to their size: V ′ (V ′′) supports c1 (c2) whose cost is 2 (2). Intuitively,
since both groups constitute exactly 1/2 of the electorate but at the same time
each ‘demands’ an item of cost 2, no feasible budget can satisfy the ‘demands’
of both groups. In Section 3.2 we describe weaker versions of Strong-BJR-L and
Strong-BPJR-L which do not suffer from this issue.
We end this section by considering the complexity of computing Strong-
BJR-L and Strong-BPJR-L budgets.
Proposition 1. Computing Strong-BJR-L and Strong-BPJR-L budgets is NP-
hard.
Proof. We reduce from the NP-hard Restricted-X3C problem [13] in which,
given sets S1, . . . , S3m over a universe x1, . . . , x3m, where each set Sj contains
3 elements and each element is contained in 3 sets, the task is to exactly cover
the universe with m sets.
Given an instance of Restricted-X3C we construct a PB scenario as follows:
For each set Sj (j ∈ [3m]) we construct an item cj of cost 3; For each element
xi (i ∈ [3m]) we have a voter vi approving all items cj which correspond to sets
Sj which contain xi (i.e., vi = {cj ∈ C : xi ∈ Sj}). We set the budget limit L
to 3m. This finishes the construction.
Given m sets which cover the universe, we select exactly those (each cost
3 so we respect the budget limit). Then, each voter gets some representative,
and Strong-BJR-L is satisfied. Strong-BPJR-L is also satisfied, as each group
of ℓn/L = ℓ voters is covered by at least ⌈ℓ/3⌉ items, of total cost at least ℓ.
For the other direction, notice that, since L = n, it follows that even a
Strong-BJR-L budget shall make sure that each voter gets represented by at
least one item. Recalling the budget limit, it means that a Strong-BJR-L budget
shall correspond to an exact cover.
3.2. BJR and BPJR
To remedy the possible non-existence of Strong-BJR-L and Strong-BPJR-L
budgets described above, below we introduce a weakening of these axioms which
address this issue; informally speaking, this is done by requiring each cohesive
group of voters to (unanimously) support some item which is sufficiently cheap.
Definition 6 (BJR-L). A budget W satisfies BJR-L if there exists no set of
voters V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≥ n/L such that w
(
∩i∈V ′Ai
)
≥ 1, w
(
(∪i∈V ′Ai)∩W
)
=
0, and there exists some c ∈ ∩i∈V ′Ai with w(c) = 1.
Remark 2. The additional requirement for cohesive groups of voters in the BJR
definition is very restrictive. For example, if there is only one item of cost one,
then any budget W containing this item will satisfy JR. Thus, the definition of
BJR is only meaningful when there are multiple items of cost one. This observa-
tion suggests that the JR budget definition is useful as a ‘minimal’ requirement
of representation but leaves a lot to be desired in terms of representation.
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In a similar manner to the definition of BJR-L, below we introduce the
axiom of BPJR-L. Here, however, our requirement allows for greater flexibility
in the additional requirement of cohesive voters supporting a ‘sufficiently cheap’
item. In particular, we allow for bundles of items and let the ‘sufficiently cheap’
criteria grow proportionally with the size of the voters group.
Definition 7 (BPJR-L). A budget W satisfies BPJR-L if for all ℓ ∈ [1, L] there
exists no set of voters V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≥ ℓ n/L such that w
(
∩i∈V ′ Ai
)
≥ ℓ and
w
(
(∪i∈V ′Ai) ∩W
)
< max
{
w(C′) : C′ ⊆ ∩i∈V ′Ai and w(C′) ≤ |V ′|L/n
}
.
The idea of the definition above is that every group of (at least) ℓ·n/L voters
should control (at least) ℓ units of the budget. Technically, however, for this
to be satisfied we need a bundle of items with ‘low enough’ cost ≤ ℓ. We then
require that at least the cost of the most expensive bundle which is also ‘low
enough’ is used in representing this group of ℓ · n/L voters. Note that indeed
BPJR-L generalizes BJR-L; specifically, BPJR-L boils down to BJR-L when
ℓ = 1.
It turns out that exhaustive BPJR-L budgets always exist. (While the pro-
cedure described in the next proof is super-polynomial, afterwards we show
that this is not a coincidence, by showing the problem of computing a budget
satisfying BPJR-L is NP-hard.)
Proposition 2. For any given budget limit L there always exists a feasible
budget W which is exhaustive and satisfies BPJR-L.
Proof. We describe an algorithm which produces feasible, exhaustive budgets,
which satisfy BPJR-L. The algorithm proceeds as follows. We iterate over ℓ′,
where initially ℓ′ = L and ℓ′ can only decrease, until ℓ′ = 1. Let A′ = A
(initially, considering all voters; during the course of the algorithm, we will
“discard” voters as we take care for them), and let W = ∅ (initially, no item is
budgeted).
In each iteration, first check whether w(W ) + ℓ′ ≤ L; if this is not the case,
then decrease ℓ′ by one and continue to the next iteration. Otherwise, let
C∗ := {C′ ⊆ C : w(c) = ℓ′}.
If C∗ = ∅, then decrease ℓ by one and continue to the next iteration. Otherwise,
for each C′ ∈ C∗, let
A(C′) = {i ∈ A′ : C′ ∈ Ai}
denote the voters from A′ which approve all items of C′. Select any C′ ∈ C∗
with maximal size of |A(C′)| and check whether |A(C′)| ≥ ℓ′ ·n/L; If this is not
the case, then decrease ℓ′ by one and continue to the next iteration. Otherwise,
set W 7→ W ∪ C′ and redefine A′ 7→ A′ \A(C′). Leave ℓ′ as is and continue to
the next iteration. The algorithm halts whenever ℓ′ = 0, in which case, if W is
non-exhaustive, then we arbitrarily add items to it until it does, while keeping
it feasible.
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Next we prove the algorithm’s correctness. Let W be the output from the
above algorithm and for the purpose of a contradiction suppose that BPJR-L
is not satisfied. That is, there exists an ℓ ∈ [1, L] and a set of voters V ′ with
|V ′| ≥ ℓn/L and w(∩i∈V ′Ai) ≥ ℓ such that there exists C′ ⊆ ∩i∈V ′Ai with
w(C′) ≤ ℓ such that
w
(
(∪i∈V ′Ai) ∩W
)
< W (C′).
Furthermore, let ℓ be the smallest number such that the above holds.
Now suppose that w(W ) = L. Then every unit spent in the budget rep-
resents at least n/L additional voters, and so the total number of adequately
represented voters is at least
w(W ) · n/L = n,
thus, there cannot be a group of |V ′| voters which are not represented by at
least |V ′|/(nL) ≥ ℓ units of budget; thus, a contradiction.
Now suppose that w(W ) < L. Then, every unit spent in the budget rep-
resents at least n/L additional voters, and so the total number of adequately
represented voters is at least
w(W ) · n/L < n.
Denote this set of voters by R ⊆ V and note that any subset V ′′ ⊆ R is ade-
quately represented in the budget with at least |V ′′|/(nL ) units of expenditure.
Noting that there exists a group V ′ of size |V ′| ≥ ℓn/L who are inadequately
represented – recalling that ℓ is the smallest number such that this holds — it
must be that the group was not represented due to the budget limit and thus
w(W ) + ℓ > L.
Now if there exists a (smallest) group V ′ of inadequately represented voters it
must be that
V ′ ⊆ V \R
and so
|V ′| ≤ n− |R|
≤ n−
w(W )n
L
=
n
L
(
L− w(W )
)
< ℓ
n
L
since w(W ) + ℓ > L,
≤ |V ′|,
thus no such set V ′ can exist and we have derived a contradiction. We conclude
that BPJR-L must be satisfied.
The next result explains why the algorithm presented in the proof above is
not polynomial-time.
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Proposition 3. Computing a BPJR-L budget is NP-hard.
Proof. We describe a reduction from the NP-hard problem Partition [13] which,
given integers x1, . . . , xm whose sum is 2B, asks to decide whether there is a
subset of them which sums to B.
Given an instance of Partition with integers x1, . . . , xm of sum 2B, we con-
struct a PB scenario for which BPJR-L budget exists if and only if the there
is a subset of those integers whose sum equals to B. Specifically, we construct
items c1, . . . , cm, where item cj (j ∈ [m]) costs xj and have 1 voter approving
all of them; we set the budget limit L to B. This finishes the construction.
Given a solution to the Partition instance, consisting of a subset X ′ ⊆ X
with
∑
x′∈X′ x
′ = B, we construct a budget W = X ′ which costs B = L and
thus is exhaustive and satisfies BPJR-L. For the other direction, notice that,
according to BPJR-L, the single voter deserves the whole budget, thus a budget
satisfying BPJR-L shall correspond to a solution to the Partition instance.
Computing BJR-L budgets, however, can be done in polynomial time. The
proof of the next proposition is by a greedy algorithm, somehow resembling
Approval-based greedy Chamberlin–Courant.
Proposition 4. There is a polynomial-time algorithm which computes an ex-
haustive budget satisfying BJR-L.
Proof. If L = 0, then W = ∅ satisfies the proposition. Let L > 0 be a budget
limit and define the set of cheapest items:
C∗ := {c ∈ C : w(c) = 1}.
If |C∗| ≤ L, then any budget W such that C∗ ⊆ W is feasible and satisfies
BJR-W. To satisfy the exhaustiveness property we add items c /∈ W to the
budget until it is exhaustive.
If |C∗| > L, then we continue according to the following procedure. Let
A′ = A, W = ∅, and let s(c, A′) = |{i ∈ A′ : c ∈ Ai}| denote the approval score
of item c with respect to the ballot profile A′. Select any c ∈ C∗ with maximal
score s(c, A′); then, set W 7→ W ∪ {c}, remove all approval ballots with c ∈ Ai
from A′, and redefine C∗ 7→ C∗ − {c}. Repeat this process until w(W ) ≥ ⌊L⌋
or until C∗ = ∅.
Note that at each stage where an item c ∈ C∗ is added to W , a group
of s(c, A′) unrepresented voters become represented. Also note that at each
stage s(c, A′) is weakly decreasing; that is, we remove voters who have been
represented and so the approval score of any item can never increase.
In the first case, the algorithm terminates with W such that w(W ) ≥ ⌊L⌋,
thus the exhaustiveness and feasibility properties are satisfied. Now, for the
purpose of a contradiction, suppose that BJR-W-L is not satisfied. Thus, there
exists an item c ∈ C∗ with s(c, A′) ≥ n/L, for A′ at the algorithm’s termination.
But since s(c, A′) is weakly decreasing at each stage and the item c˜ ∈ C∗ with
maximal score is added each time, but c ∈ C∗ was never elected, it must be that
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every one of the |W | = w(W ) items added to W represented at least |W | · n/L
distinct voters.
Notice, however, that as
|W | · n/L ≥ ⌊L⌋n/L > (L− 1)n/L = n− n/L,
it would mean that strictly more than n − n/L voters were represented –
meaning that there can no exists a set V ′ of unrepresented voters with |V ′| ≥
n/L; this gives a contradiction.
For the second case, note that there is no cheapest item supported by any
voter - let alone a cohesive group of ≥ n/L voters. Thus, the budget W satisfies
BJR-L. To ensure that the exhaustiveness property is satisfied we (arbitrarily)
add items c /∈W until the budget is exhaustive (but still remains feasible).
We end this section by considering the complexity of testing whether a given
budget satisfies BJR-L (and Strong-BJR-L).
Proposition 5. There is a polynomial-time algorithm to test whether a given
budget satisfies BJR-L and Strong-BJR-L.
Proof. Given a PB scenario with items C, voters V , and budget limit L, and a
budget W , the task is to decide whether W satisfies BJR-L or Strong-BJR-L.
We proceed by describing a procedure for BJR-L and mention how it shall be
modified for Strong-BJR-L.
First, we find all voters which are not represented at all; formally, let V ′′ :=
{v ∈ V : V ∩W = ∅}. Next, for each c ∈ C (or, for Strong-BJR-L, for each
c ∈ {c ∈ C : w(c) = 1}), consider the voters in V ′′ which approve c; formally,
let V ′′C = {v
′′ ∈ V ′′ : c ∈ v′}. Then, if |V ′′c | ≥ n/L, reject. If reached the end,
accept.
3.3. Local-BPJR
As we are interested in efficient budgeting methods which output budgets
satisfying certain forms of proportional representation, the computational hard-
ness result of the last section is somewhat disappointing, as it presumably rules
out the possibility of efficient methods which compute exhaustive BPJR-L bud-
gets. Here we consider weaker versions of these concepts and then we describe
an efficient budgeting method which computes budgets satisfying it.
Definition 8 (Local-BPJR-L). A budget W satisfies Local-BPJR-L if for all
ℓ ∈ [1, L] there exists no set of voters V ′ ⊆ V such that W ′ = (∪i∈V ′Ai) ∩W ,
|V ′| ≥ ℓ n/L and there exists some W ′′ ⊃W ′ such that
W ′′ ∈ max
{
w(C′) : C′ ⊆ ∩i∈V ′Ai and w(C
′) ≤ ℓ
}
.
Janson [16] reports on several interesting rules, developed by Phragmen,
which were designed to achieve proportionality axioms in multi-winner voting.
Brill et al. [7] proved that one of these rule, which they referred to as Phragmen’s
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Input: (N,C,w, L) % resp.: voters, items, cost function, limit
Output: W % budget
1 W ←− ∅
2 while C′′ = {c /∈ W : w(W ) + w(c) ≤ L ∧ ∃i ∈ N : c ∈ Ai} 6= ∅ do
3 Let C∗ = {c′ : c′ ∈ argminc′∈C′′ sc′} where:
% argmin set
4 xc,i ≥ 0 (∀c ∈ C, ∀i ∈ N)
5 xc,i = 0 (∀c ∈ C, ∀i ∈ N such that c /∈ Ai)
6
∑
i∈N xc,i = w(c) (∀c ∈W ∪ {c
′})
7
∑
i∈N xc,i = 0 (∀c /∈ W ∪ {c
′})
8 xi =
∑
c∈C xci (∀i ∈ N)
9 sc′ ≥ xi (∀i ∈ N)
10 Let c∗ ∈ C∗ % break ties arbitrarily
11 W ←−W ∪ {c∗}
12 return W
Algorithm 1: Generalized Phragmen’s sequential rule for PB (GPseq).
sequential rule, computes a committee that satisfies PJR (this refers to the
proportionality axiom for multi-winner voting). Here, we generalize Phragmen’s
sequential rule [7, 16] to the case of PB.
Our generalized rule is referred to as GPseq (Generalized Phragmen’s se-
quential rule) and proceeds as follows. Items are iteratively added until no
item can be added without exceeding the budget limit. An item that is added
is required to spread its cost among voters who approve it. When an item is
considered to be added to the set of selected items, we check what will be the
maximum cost received by a voter. We select the item that minimizes the max-
imum cost received by voters (we discuss tie breaking later). The rule is also
shown in Algorithm 1.
Remark 3. When distributing the cost of the current item, we are allowed to
redistribute the cost of the already-chosen items; this can be directly implemented
using a linear program (as in Algorithm 1), but also shown to be polynomial-time
solvable using a combinatorial argument, as shown by Brill et al. [7].
Remark 4. Currently, Line 2 in Algorithm 1 does not consider items c which
are not approved by any voter. As can be seen from the proof of Proposition 6,
leaving the algorithm as is still results in it satisfying Local-BPJR. Perhaps
unsatisfactory, however, the resulting budgets might be non-exhaustive due to
some items c which are not approved by any voter (but fits within the budget
limit).
One possible fix is by including a post-processing phase, specifically looking
for such items at the end of the algorithm and adding them exhaustively. In
situations where not approving an item simply means not caring for him, it might
makes sense; however, if not approving an item actually means disapproving
him, then it might reduce the social welfare.
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Before we prove that GPseq satisfies Local-BPJR-L, the next example shows
that, unfortunately, it does not satisfy BPJR-L.
Example 2. Consider the following instance with C = {a, b, c, d} and w(a) =
2, w(b) = w(c) = 1.5 and w(d) = 1. Let there be 6 voters with approvals
A1 = . . . = A4 = {a, b} A5 = A6 = {c}.
If GPseq is run with L = 3, then in the first iteration W1 = {b}, and in the
second we add item c. Thus the computed budget is:
W = {b, c} and w(W ) = 3.
This budget does not satisfy BPJR-W since the group of voters V ′ = {1, . . . , 4}
is of size ≥ 2 · n/w(W ) = 4 and unanimously support a bundle {a} with cost 2
but they were only represented by a bundle of cost 1.5 (i.e., item b).
Proposition 6. GPseq satisfies Local-BPJR-L.
Proof. Assume, towards a contradiction, that there is a PB scenario where
GPseq outputs a budget W which violates Local-BPJR-L. By definition, this
means that there is a number ℓ ∈ [1, L], a set of voters |V ′| ≥ ℓn/L, and some
W ′′ ⊃W ′ := (∪i∈V ′Ai) ∩W such that
W ′′ ∈ max
{
w(C′) : C′ ⊆ ∩i∈V ′Ai and w(C
′) ≤ ℓ
}
.
First, observe that it must be the case that w(W ′) < ℓ (since otherwise no
such W ′′ could be feasible). As W ′ ⊂ W ′′, there must be some c∗ ∈ W ′′ \W ′,
and, asW ′ = (∪i∈V ′Ai)∩W , it must be that c∗ /∈ W . Further, sinceW ′∪{c∗} ⊆
W ′′, the following holds:
w(W ′) + w(c∗) ≤ w(W ′′) ≤ ℓ. (1)
Recall that GPseq works in iterations, where in each iteration another item
is added to the intermediate budget W . Further, before the first iteration it is
possible to add c∗ to the partial budget, since the partial budget is empty; while
after the last iteration it is surely not possible anymore, as if it was so, then
GPseq would not terminate. The proof would now follow by considering the
iteration at which the corresponding ‘switch’ had happened, and would show
that the maximum voter spread could have been smaller if c∗ would have been
chosen instead of the other item which was chosen; this would contradict the
way by which GPseq works.
To be more formal, the following notation is helpful. Denote the intermediate
budget at the completion of the jth iteration of GPseq byW j ; and by xji and s
∗
j ,
the spread of voter i and the maximum voter spread (respectively; specifically,
s∗j = maxi∈V x
j
i ) at the completion of that iteration.
Supplied with the above notation, let j be the index of the first iteration for
which the following hold:
w(W j−1) + w(c∗) ≤ L, (2)
w(W j) + w(c∗) > L. (3)
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Recall that such j must exist as otherwise GPseq would not have terminated.
Next we compute a lower bound on the maximum voter spread in W j . As
W ′ = (∪i∈V ′Ai)∩W it follows that the total weight of the items inWj\(W ′∩W j)
is spread over at most n− |V ′| voters (those corresponding to voters not in V ′).
Then, from averaging, if follows that there must be at least one voter k ∈ V \V ′
for which the following hold:
xjk ≥
w(W j)− w(W ′ ∩W j)
n− |V ′|
>
L− w(c∗)− w(W ′ ∩W j)
n− |V ′|
by (3)
≥
L− ℓ
n− |V ′|
by (1)
≥
L− ℓ
n
L (L− ℓ)
since |V ′| ≥ ℓ
n
L
,
=
L
n
.
As s∗j = maxi∈V x
j
i , it follows that
s∗j >
L
n
.
Next we compute an upper bound on the maximum voter spread if, in-
stead of adding the item added in the jth iteration, we would add c∗ at that
iteration. Thus, the budget at the completion of the jth iteration will be
W j
′
= W j−1 ∪ {c∗}. Let us denote the alternative values of xji and s
∗
j by
xji
′
and s∗j
′, respectively.
Recall that GPseq considers minimizing the maximum voter spread, thus to
compute an upper bound it is sufficient to consider one way of spreading c∗’s
weight; we will consider spreading it evenly among the voters in V ′. That way,
the spread of voters k ∈ V \V ′ remains unchanged to the previous iteration j−1;
i.e., for k ∈ V \V ′ it holds that:
xjk
′
= xj−1k . (4)
Let
s˜∗j−1 = max
k/∈V ′
xj−1k = max
k/∈V ′
xjk
′
, (5)
this denotes the maximum spread among voters in V \V ′ at the (j − 1)th itera-
tion (or equivalently the alternative maximum spread of such voters in the jth
iteration). Note that some weight of items in W ′ ∩W j−1 may be distributed to
voters in V \V ′ at this (j − 1)th iteration.
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Further, by redistributing the weight at the (j − 1)th iteration
∑
i∈V ′
xj−1i ≤ w(W
′ ∩W j−1)
evenly among voters in V ′ we can maintain equality in (4). We then construct
the alternative value of spreads for voters in V ′ by evenly distributed the weight
of item c∗ as well. Thus, for all i ∈ V ′
xji
′
=
∑
i∈V ′ x
j−1
i
|V ′|
+
w(c∗)
|V ′|
≤
w(W ′ ∩W j−1)
|V ′|
+
w(c∗)
|V ′|
≤
ℓ
|V ′|
by (1)
≤
L
n
.
Recall (5), it follows that under this spread,
s∗j
′ = max
(
s˜∗j−1,max
i∈V ′
(xji
′
)
)
.
Next we consider two cases. First, if s˜∗j−1 ≤
L
n , then we are done as this
would imply that
s∗j
′ ≤
L
n
< s∗j ,
which contradicts the fact the GPseq minimizes s∗j at each iteration.
For the second case, suppose that s˜∗j−1 >
L
n and so
s∗j−1 >
L
n
.
This would imply that at some earlier iteration, say t < j, we have
s∗t−1 ≤
L
n
and s∗t >
L
n
(as initially no weight is spread on the voters). Further, as c∗ /∈W and W t−1 ⊆
W and W t ⊆W , for the intermediate budgets W t−1 and W t it holds that
w(W t−1) < w(W t) ≤ w(W j−1) ≤ L− w(c∗).
This means that adding the item c∗ does not cause us to exceed the budget
limit L since t < j and j is the earliest stage such that (2) and (3) are satisfied.
Thus, if at stage t instead item c∗ was added to the intermediate budget W t
then by spreading the additional weight w(c∗) among agents in V ′ we can attain
the following alternative maximum voter spread:
s∗t
′ ≤
L
n
< s∗t .
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This contradicts the fact that GPseq minimizes s∗j at each iteration.
Overall, we conclude that no such set V ′ can exist and thus Local-BPJR-L
is satisfied.
Tie breaking. Notice that both Theorem 6 and Example 2 are oblivious to
the tie breaking used by GPseq. Arguably, its tie-breaking can result in some
not-intuitive behavior, as the following example shows. Let C = {c1, c2} with
w(c1) = 1 and w(c2) = 2 and let there be voters V = {1, . . . , 6} with the
following ballots:
A1 = · · · = A4 = {c2} A5 = A6 = {c1}.
Then, if we have a budget limit L = 2, then the items to be chosen for Phragmen-
budget will be either c1 or c2. Now, if we favor cheaper items, or simply choose c1
arbitrarily, then we will ‘satisfy’ only 2 voters; whilst, perhaps a more intuitive
outcome would be W ′ = {c2} which is of a cost w(W ) = L = 2 and satisfies 4
voters. Both budgets, however, satisfy BPJR-L in this case.
3.4. W-variants and Relations between Axioms
So far our axioms of proportionality depended on an external budget limit L.
Indeed, being based on L, such definitions are easily communicated, as usually
L is known before hand; further, each group of voters can easily compute and
appreciate the fraction of L which they can claim for themselves.
There is, however, some merit in being oblivious to L, by considering pro-
portionality axioms which are oblivious to L, and are properties of the budget
itself (with respect to the electorate, of course). This is possible through what
we refer to as W-variants. Specifically, instead of considering groups of voters of
ℓ · n/L (which, as our definitions above state, deserve ℓ units of the budget), in
our W-variants we concentrate not on the external budget limit L but on the ac-
tual total cost of the budget w(W ), and consider groups of voters of ℓ ·n/w(W ),
which deserve ℓ units of the budget. We feel that these definitions, which are
based on w(W ) are, mathematically speaking, more elegant, as they are prop-
erties of the budget itself and are oblivious to the externally-imposed budget
limit. Formally, we suggest the following definitions (which are analogous to
their L-variants described in the previous sections).
Definition 9 (Strong-BJR-W). A budget W satisfies Strong-BJR-W if there
exists no set of voters V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≥ n/w(W ), such that w
(
∩i∈V ′ Ai
)
≥ 1
but w
(
(∪i∈V ′Ai) ∩W
)
= 0.
Definition 10 (Strong-BPJR-W). A budget W satisfies Strong-BPJR-W if
for all ℓ ∈ [1, w(W )] there does not exist a set of voters V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≥
ℓ n/w(W ), such that w
(
∩i∈V ′ Ai
)
≥ ℓ but w
(
(∪i∈V ′Ai) ∩W
)
< ℓ.
Definition 11 (BJR-W). A budget W satisfies BJR-W if there exists no set of
voters V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≥ n/w(W ) such that w
(
∩i∈V ′ Ai
)
≥ 1, w
(
(∪i∈V ′Ai)∩
W
)
= 0, and there exists some c ∈ ∩i∈V ′Ai with w(c) = 1.
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Definition 12 (BPJR-W). A budget W satisfies BPJR-W if for all ℓ ∈
[1, w(W )] there exists no set of voters V ′ ⊆ V with |V ′| ≥ ℓ n/w(W ) such
that w
(
∩i∈V ′ Ai
)
≥ ℓ and
w
(
(∪i∈V ′Ai) ∩W
)
< max
{
w(C′) : C′ ⊆ ∩i∈V ′Ai and w(C
′) ≤ ℓ
}
.
Definition 13 (Local-BPJR-W). A budget W satisfies Local-BPJR-W if for
all ℓ ∈ [1, L] there exists no set of voters V ′ ⊆ V such that W ′ = (∪i∈V ′Ai)∩W ,
|V ′| ≥ ℓ n/w(W ) and there exists some W ′′ ⊃W ′ such that
W ′′ ∈ max
{
w(C′) : C′ ⊆ ∩i∈V ′Ai and w(C
′) ≤ ℓ
}
.
Notice that each L-variant implies its corresponding W-variant.
Proposition 7. Any L-variant implies its W-variant.
Proof. In the L-variants ℓ ∈ [1, L] while in the W-variants ℓ ∈ [1, w(W )], and
w(W ) ≤ L always holds. Further, the sets V ′ considered in the L-variants
satisfy |V ′| ≥ ℓn/L while those in the W-variants satisfy |V ′| ≥ ℓn/w(W );
again, w(W ) ≤ L holds, it follows that n/L ≤ n/w(W ). Therefore, each L-
variant considers all sets considered by its corresponding W-variant.
Notice that W-variants always exist, as, for example, the empty budget
B = ∅ satisfies them (as our voter set is always finite). Thus, it makes more sense
to require also exhaustiveness from such budgets; for example, considering the
complexity of computing exhaustive Local-BPJR-W budgets. Indeed, tractabil-
ity of computing an L-variant implies tractability of computing an exhaustive
W-variant. On the other hand, exhaustive W-variants might be computation-
ally easier to compute than their corresponding L-variants; while we know that
computing exhaustive Strong-BJR-W budgets and exhaustive Strong-BPJR-W
budgets is NP-hard, we could not modify the proof of hardness of computing
BPJR-L budgets (Theorem 3) to apply to exhaustive BPJR-W budgets as well.
We conjecture, however, that indeed computing exhaustive BPJR-W is NP-hard
as well.
We conclude the section by further discussing the logical relations between
the axioms presented and discussed in the sections above. These relations are
also pictorially represented in Figure 1.
Proposition 8. Strong-BPJR-(W/L) implies BPJR-(W/L) which implies
Local-BPJR-(W/L) which implies BJR-(W/L).
Proof. The definition of BPJR-(W/L) includes a check on V ′ which is not
present in the definition of Strong-BPJR-(W/L), and thus is implied by it. The
definition of Local-BPJR-(W/L) considers specific sets W ′′ to represent certain
groups, therefore is implied by BPJR-(W/L) which consider more sets.
To show that Local-BPJR-(W/L) implies BJR-(W/L) we use the contraposi-
tive by assuming that BJR-(W/L) is not satisfied. This implies that there exists
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Strong-BPJR-L
BPJR-L
Local-BPJR-L
BJR-L
Strong-BJR-L
Strong-BPJR-W
BPJR-W
Local-BPJR-W
BJR-W
Strong-BJR-W
Figure 1: Logical relations between proportionality concepts. An arrow from (A) to (B)
denotes that concept (A) implies concept (B).
a group of voters V ′ such that |V ′| ≥ n/w(W ) (or ≥ n/L), w(∪i∈V ′Ai) ≥ 1, and
some c ∈ ∩i∈V ′Ai with w(c) = 1 exists, but nevertheless w
(
(∪i∈V ′Ai)∩W
)
= 0.
Recalling the definition of Local-BPJR-(W/L), this implies that W ′ = ∅ and so
Local-BPJR-(W/L) is not satisfied if there exists any budget W ′′ (since every
budget contains the empty set) containing some subset of items C′ ⊆ ∩i∈V ′Ai
and w(C′) ≤ ℓ such that w(W ′′) > w(W ′). Such a budget always exists since
a BJR-(W/L) budget always exists (Proposition 2), and a budget satisfying
BJR-(W/L) satisfies the conditions for W ′′ to fail W as a Local BPJR-(W/L)
budget.
4. Conclusions
Participatory budgeting is an interesting and widely applicable setting, gain-
ing growing attention from the research community and being more extensively
deployed. The axiomatic, normative study of methods of participatory budget-
ing is still lacking, and issues of proportionality and representation are currently
not well understood; this is especially unfortunate as many times it is desirable
to spend funds in a proportional way, taking into account issues of representa-
tiveness, and not letting the majority control all the available budget. Thus,
in this paper, we proposed several new, proportional representation axioms as
well as efficient corresponding algorithms. Many of our results are summarized
in Table 1.
As we framed participatory budgeting as a generalization of multi-winner
voting, our axioms and rules can also be viewed as interesting generalizations
of work on multi-winner voting. Some of the interesting insights include the
following: Whereas both PAV and Phragmen’s sequential rule are considered
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compelling rules for approval-based multi-winner voting, the latter is more suit-
able in being extended to more general settings such as PB. Recalling our re-
search motivation from Section 1, where we stated our aim at finding the right
axiom and corresponding rule for PB, as a conclusion we can say that BPJR-L
appears to be a compelling axiom for proportional representation of PB and
GPseq seems to be a particularly useful and desirable rule in this context.
We envisage further work on axiomatic and computational aspects of par-
ticipatory budgeting. It will be interesting to explore the trade-offs between the
axioms we proposed and other axioms that might be important to consider in
these applications. It may also be useful to, theoretically and empirically, com-
pare how different rules in the literature fare in terms of axiomatic properties.
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